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Intelligence: The Reagan

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THE ELECTION OF RONALD REAGAN has given the American intelligence community a desperately needed reprieve from its "slow murder" at the hands of the Carter Administration. It has meant not only the imminent departure of the Director of Central Intelligence Stansfield Turner, but a stay of execution from the debilitating web of "reforms" that was beginning to strangle virtually every major intelligence activity. For the first time in years, it is now possible to consider what intelligence should be, rather than how to improve its moral behavior or how it can best be dominated by a single personality.

It is essential, however, that the Reagan Administration do more than simply try to "revitalize" the old intelligence community, or shift its existing structure to support new policies. American intelligence cannot function effectively by repeating its past. It does not need to go back to its old methods of estimation and analysis; it needs new ones. It does not need the clandestine services of the 1960s and 1970s; it needs new ones. In short, it needs to move forward, and not simply to repair the damage of the last few years.

Intelligence: The Reagan Challenges

This will not be a simple task. On the one hand, many of the men who have fought hardest to defend the community over the last half-decade have never really prepared themselves to consider what intelligence must be in the future. On the other hand, the list of challenges the new Administration faces are long and grim:

- A new approach to analysis is needed. The President does not need a single best view, a guru, or a prophet; the nation needs the best analysis of the full range of views and data it can get.
- A new approach must be taken to the "fusion" of information from all sources. The "barrier" between intelligence and the rest of the National Security Community must be eliminated.
- Net assessment activity must be revitalized and made the core of the estimative process. This must include joint efforts by the intelligence community and the user, and a new focus on allied and third world nations.
- A strong outside advisory board must be established to replace the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB) and Senior Review Panel, with an input from the best minds available. Smaller, more specialized, outside advisory bodies are needed to ensure that all key intelligence activities constantly have an input from the outside world.
- An end must be

sively orients all intelligence activity to ward allowing one man to compete for the ear of the President. The theaters and unified and specified commands, need dedicated and survivable assets. The military Services, the Departments, and the Agencies need resources they can control. DIA and CIA need to be allowed independence, and some degree of duplication. Similarly, the user needs the "control" imposed by allowing independent analysis by the other members of the community.

- The present Intelligence Community Staff must be reformed, the present mix of half-informed outsiders and intelligence hacks and rethoricals needs to be dismissed, and a better balance established between central review and the need for decentralized activities that are user-oriented and dominated.

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- The current farce taking place in allocating collection assets must be ended, along with the Collection Tasking Staff, and it must be replaced with something that serves the user, not the collection manager.
- The problem of space boosters and survival must be re-examined, and the necessary number and diversity of launch vehicles provided.
- The focus on centralized space systems must be replaced with the proper balance of theater and national systems, and new forms of human intelligence (humint).
- The disaster that has resulted from the effort to integrate all "CI" activities in a way that gives precedence to technology over function, nets everything in sight, and relies in large part on the Worldwide Military Command Communications System (WWMCCS), needs a transition "pink slip." CI is precisely the kind of "high tech" that the nation does not need.
- A new clandestine operations service must be established in close cooperation with the Special Operations elements in the military. It must be professional, have tight Presidential control, be subject to forced early retirement, and made independent of humint and clandestine collection.
- A problem of counterintelligence needs a solution that will effectively link the CIA, NSA, and FBI, and put an end to

to the community of intelligence information requests.

Not only William Casey, but all the senior officials involved in this aspect of the Reagan Administration should recognize from the start that none of these intelligence challenges can be met simply by returning to the "status quo ante Turner" or even "ante Vietnam." They can only be met by a new approach to the whole concept of intelligence.

Ending the "Mystique" of Intelligence

Intelligence analysis has suffered sharply in the last few years from poor middle managers, and inadequate training and numbers of personnel. It has also suffered from a lack of competitive career advancement opportunities and the loss of skilled professionals, and from efforts at over-coordination and over-centralization. All of these problems need attention under the new Administration.

At the same time, intelligence analysis has long been crippled by its own "mystique." It has been oversold as a definitive source of secret wisdom, when it is nothing more than the product of the material obtained through special collection means, with vast inherent gaps and limitations, as written up by junior and medium grade civilians and officers. Intelligence "products" or reports are also weakened by every other problem in the chain of intelligence collection to production, and—in most cases—by the fact that the few analysts covering a given area are grossly overworked, no better than any other group of professionals, and are kept isolated from much of the traffic and data available to policymakers.

Further, the cadre of analysts on which the intelligence product depends for its quality is incredibly small for the number of issues and tasks it must deal with, and has had little recent continuity. Although its training has improved in recent years, many countries are not covered by even one full-time analyst, and there is a gross shortfall of analysts who speak the language of the country they study and who have any direct area expertise in the nations they cover.

While the new Administration can improve the resources available for intelligence analysis, it can only do so slowly, and they will never be fully adequate. The world is much more complex than it was in 1945, or even 1960. Today, small coun-